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From Income to Consumption Tax: 
· Some International Implications 
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH* 
The international tax regime is based on a delicate consensus among 
nations, which has developed gradually since the 1920s. This regime 
has evolved, since the end of World War II, into an elaborate system of 
widely accepted compromises embodied in tax treaties. The system's 
main purpose is to prevent double taxation of the same item of income 
of the same taxpayer by two jurisdictions. Such double taxation can 
arise, for example, when a taxpayer who is a resident of country A 
derives some income from a source in country B, and countries A and 
B both assert jurisdiction to tax that income. 
To prevent such double taxation, a compromise has been reached 
between source and residence jurisdictions: The right to tax active 
business income is granted mostly to the source country, while the right 
to tax passive (non-business) income is granted mostly to the residence 
country. 1 The residence country bears the responsibility of avoiding 
double taxation of active income by either crediting the source country 
tax against its own tax liability, or by exempting foreign source active 
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I. For a general description of this compromise and some of its limitations see 
Reuven S. A vi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1301 (1996), and the sources cited therein. 
1329 
business income altogether. On the other hand, the source country has 
the responsibility to avoid double taxation of passive income by reducing 
its taxation of such income when it is taxed in the residence country. 
The current consensus is far from perfect, and in particular, faces two 
major problems relating to the two main types of income (active 
business income and passive income). The main problem regarding 
active business income, which is taxed primarily by the source country, 
is to determine the source of that income; if two ( or more) countries 
claim the income derives from sources within them, the tax treaty 
network will not address the ensuing double (or triple, etc.) taxation. 
The main problem regarding passive income, which is taxed primarily 
by the taxpayer's country of residence, is enforcing the tax, especially 
when the residence jurisdiction does not have adequate resources to 
collect taxes from its residents. In recent years, this problem has been 
exacerbated because several significant taxing jurisdictions (including the 
U.S.) have entered into a competition to attract foreign investment and 
have, therefore, abolished their withholding taxes on certain types of 
passive income (primarily interest). 
Notwithstanding these problems, the existence of the consensus 
described above is remarkable given the sensitivity of the issue involved; 
after all, the ability to collect taxes is an essential attribute of sovereignty 
and giving up any tax revenue for a theoretical ideal of avoiding double 
taxation is hard for any politician to propose (as Senator Long has 
observed, taxing foreigners has been a perennially popular idea).2 
The consensus relies on the premise that participants share a common 
set of tax bases, including, in particular, the personal and corporate 
income taxes, which are the main focus of tax treaties. This premise, 
however, may no longer be valid. Specifically, there are now three 
major proposals under serious consideration in the United States which 
would abolish the U.S. corporate and personal income taxes and 
implement in their place a type of consumption tax. The main purpose 
of this Article is to consider some possible implications for the 
international tax regime of such a development.3 
2. "Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree." Jeffrey L. 
Yablon, As Certain as Death - Quotations About Taxes, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 225-112 
(Nov. 17, 1994), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (statement of Senator 
Russell B. Long (D. La.)). See also Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc. 
E.F.S.73 F.19 at 40 (1923) ("A survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how 
completely Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner."). 
3. For other discussions of this issue see Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The 
International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619 (1995); 
Reuven S. A vi-Yonah, Comment on Grubert and Newlon, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 259 ( 1996); 
Harry Grabert & T. Scott Newlon, Reply to Avi-Yonah, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 267 (1996) 
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The Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly describes the three 
main proposals to replace the corporate and personal income tax with a 
type of consumption tax: the national sales tax (NST), the fl.at tax, and 
the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax, with emphasis on their 
international aspects. Under all three proposals the effective tax rate on 
new investment in the United States will be zero. Part I suggests that, 
solely from an international tax perspective, a destination-based tax like 
the USA tax or the NST is superior to an origin-based tax like the fl.at 
tax, primarily because a destination-based tax addresses the transfer 
pricing problem, which is a major challenge to the current system. 
Part II describes the potential international implications of the 
three consumption tax proposals. It concludes that, under all three 
proposals, direct and portfolio investors in both the U.S. and foreign 
countries will have an incentive to shift their investment activities into 
the United States. This shift will exacerbate the two major problems 
facing the current regime. First, multinationals will have an incentive 
to shift their income into the U.S., which will make it more difficult to 
reach a consensus on the source of active business income. Second, 
passive investors will be able to derive tax free income from the U.S., 
which will make it more difficult for their residence jurisdictions to tax 
that income, especially if the United States ceases to cooperate in 
information exchange programs. 
The more difficult task is to try to predict the reaction of other 
countries to these likely developments. Part II tentatively suggests that 
two types of possible reactions exist. Countries that have relatively little 
bargaining power and that depend on foreign investment (which may not 
be forthcoming if they maintain higher effective tax rates than the U.S.) 
may follow the U.S. lead and abolish their income taxes, either replacing 
them with an increase in their existing consumption taxes or cutting 
government spending. On the other hand, countries that can rely on 
some level of inbound investment even while maintaining a higher 
[hereinafter Grubert & Newlon, Reply]; James R. Hines, Fundamental Tax Reform in an 
International Setting, Paper presented at the Brookings Institute, February 15, 1996 (on 
file with author); Charles E. McLure Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to 
the Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 70 (Michael J. 
Boskin ed. 1996); and Stephen E. Shay, Memorandum to ABA Tax Section Tax Systems 
Task Force On Selected International Tax Issues Raised by the Domenici-Nunn USA Tax 
Act of 1995 (S. 722) and the Armey-Shelby Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act (H.R. 
2060, S. 1050) (October 4, 1995). 
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effective tax rate (i.e., our major trading partners) may react to the 
abolition of the U.S. income tax base by attempting to capture the 
revenues foregone by the U.S. This could in tum lead to a "tax war" as 
the international tax regime is replaced by increased competition among 
tax jurisdictions for those tax revenues. 
Part III discusses the possible impact of tax reform on the U.S. tax 
treaty network and concludes that our treaty partners would be entitled 
to terminate their treaties with the U.S. if it abolished the income tax. 
Also, some of our major treaty partners may not be interested in 
maintaining their treaties with the U.S. if the U.S. income tax is replaced 
by a consumption tax. The reasons for this possible outcome are (a) 
there would be no U.S. source-based taxation of active business income, 
so that treaties would not be needed to prevent double taxation; (b) 
either there would be no U.S. taxation of passive investment (under two 
of the three consumption tax proposals) or other countries may not want 
the U.S. to reduce its withholding taxes on such investment given the 
incentive for their residents to invest in the U.S.; and (c) other countries 
may wish to be able to discriminate against U.S. investors in an attempt 
to capture the tax base foregone by the United States. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the question whether the effect of the 
consumption tax proposals on the international tax regime will .be 
positive or negative. The answer to this question depends to a large 
extent on the answer to the question posed in Part II, namely how other 
countries would react to such a move by the U.S. If most countries 
were to shift to a consumption tax base, there may be relatively few 
negative effects from abandoning the current international tax regime. 
If, on the other hand, many significant countries attempted to preserve 
an income tax base, the most likely result would be intensified tax 
competition and reduced cooperation, and it may not be possible to 
maintain the delicate balance underlying the regime. The outcome in 
that case may be increased double taxation as well as increased 
opportunities for avoiding all taxation and more tax-induced distortions 
in global investment :flows. In that case, the question will be what steps 
the U.S. can take to mitigate those negative effects. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE THREE REFORM 
PROPOSALS 
As discussed elsewhere in this issue, there are three major proposals 
currently on the table to achieve fundamental tax reform, by replacing 
the personal and corporate income taxes with some type of consumption 
tax. These are, in increasing order of complexity, the proposal . to 
abolish the income tax and replace it with the NST, espoused by (among 
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others) Chairman Archer and former presidential candidate Senator 
Lugar; the flat tax, proposed by (among others) Representative Armey 
and former Presidential candidate Steve Forbes; and the USA tax 
proposal for a progressive consumption tax, sponsored by (among others) 
Senators Nunn and Domenici.4 The rationale for these proposals has 
been examined extensively elsewhere and is the topic of other Articles 
in this issue. 5 Therefore, it will not be elaborated upon here. 
A. A Brief Description of the International Aspects of the Three 
Proposals 
1. The National Sales Tax 
The NST proposal is by far the simplest, as well as the most 
straightforward, of the three proposals mentioned above.6 Rep. Archer 
and Sen. Lugar would abolish both the corporate and individual income 
taxes and replace them with a national retail sales tax (in addition to the 
sales taxes levied by most of the states). Since the sales tax would, by 
4. For the NST, see National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996, H.R. 3039, 104th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), introduced by Representative Schaefer and others on March 6, 
1996. For the Armey-Shelby flat tax proposal, see Freedom and Fairness Restoration 
Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) introduced by House Majority Leader Richard Armey and Senator Richard Shelby 
on July 19, 1995. For the Nunn-Domenici USA tax proposal see S. 722, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1995), introduced by Senators Nunn, Domenici, and Kerrey on April 25, 1995, 
and the detailed explanation found in Paul H. O'Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Unlimited 
Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System: Description and Explanation of the Unlimited 
Savings Allowance Income Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482 (Special Supplement, March 
10, 1995) [hereinafter O'Neill & Lutz, Description]. 
5. See Alvin C. Warren Jr., The Proposal/or an 'Unlimited Savings Allowance,' 
68 TAX NOTES 1103 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a 
Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System, 68 TAX NOTES 1109 (1995); Alan L. Feld, 
Nunn-Domenici and Nonprofits, 68 TAX NOTES 1119 (1995); Bernard Wolfman, 
Corporate Tax Issues Under the Nunn-Domenici Consumption Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 1121 
(1995); Bruce Bartlett, Replacing Federal Taxes with a Sales Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 997 
(1995); Peter Merrill et al., Corporate Tax Liability Under the USA and Flat Taxes, 68 
TAX NOTES 741 (1995); Rachelle B. Bernstein et al., Tax Reform 1995: Looking at Two 
Options, 68 TAX NOTES 327 (1995). For a general description of these proposals see 
Joint Committee on Taxation, Report on Impact on International Competitiveness of 
Replacing the Federal Income Tax (JCS-5-96) (July 17, 1996), reprinted in 96 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 141-7 (July 19, 1996), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File 
[hereinafter JCT Report]. 
6. See H.R. 3039. For an examination of this proposal see Bartlett, supra note 
5. 
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definition, apply only to consumption, any savings would be exempt 
from tax until consumed. 
From an international perspective, the NST (as envisaged in H.R. 
3039) is destination-based, i.e., it applies to imports but not to exports, 
like the value added taxes (VATs) of our major trading partners. 
Specifically, the NST applies to the use, consumption, or enjoyment in 
the United States of any taxable property or service, whether produced 
or rendered within or without the United States, but it does not apply to 
any property or service exported from the United States for use, 
consumption, or enjoyment outside the United States.7 Clearly, there 
would be no taxation of inbound investment into the U.S. under the 
NST, either in the form of an income tax or withholding taxes. 
2. The Flat Tax 
The fiat tax proposal is more complicated than the NST, and some of 
its details have not been fully worked out. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to extrapolate the main international aspects of the proposal from the 
bills filed by Representative Armey and Senator Shelby, and from the 
description of the fiat tax by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, who 
originated the idea.8 
Instead of the current income tax system, Armey and Shelby propose 
to substitute two fiat rate consumption-based taxes: an individual tax and 
a business tax. The individual tax, at a rate between 17% and 20%, 
would apply only to earned income (generally, compensation for 
personal services, such as wages earned by an employee) less a relatively 
high standard deduction ($21,400 per joint return, plus $5,000 for each 
dependent).9 Dividends, interest, capital gains, and other forms of 
investment income would not be taxed. 10 
The business tax, at a rate identical to the individual tax rate, would 
apply to all businesses (including sole proprietorships and partnerships 
as well as corporations) on a cash flow basis, i.e., businesses would be 
allowed to deduct all expenses for business inputs (goods and services) 
7. Ordinarily, the tax would be collected from the seller, but in the case of a 
taxable good or service purchased outside the U.S. for use, consumption, or enjoyment 
in the U.S., it would be collected from the purchaser. Special rules are provided for 
financial intermediation and transportation services. See H.R. 3039; JCT Report, supra 
note 5, at 214. . 
8. See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1995). 
9. H.R. 2060 § 101 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 63); S. 1050 § 101 
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 63). 
10. H.R. 2060 § 101; S. 1050 § 101. 
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and tangible personal and real property on a current basis.11 In 
addition, businesses would be allowed a deduction for compensation.12 
Financial income, such as dividends and interest, would be excluded and 
no deduction would be allowed for interest. 13 
The flat tax would be territorial at both the business and personal 
levels. 14 The business tax would apply to revenue from sales in the 
United States plus the value of exported products; deductions would be 
allowed for business inputs in the United States as well as the value of 
imported inputs. 15 If a U.S. firm sends parts to a plant in Mexico and 
imports the finished product, the value of the exported parts would be 
included in income and the value of the imported product allowed as a 
deduction. 16 Similarly, the wage tax would only apply to earnings from 
work performed in the United States, whether by U.S. citizens and 
residents or by non-residents, but would exempt earnings from work 
performed abroad ( as well as, of course, all unearned income, whether 
foreign or domestic).17 
While the business tax resembles a subtraction method Value Added 
Tax (VAT), it differs from it in one crucial component, namely the 
deductibility of wages. (It may, indeed, be thought of as a subtraction 
method VAT, with employees being registered VAT taxpayers so that 
payments to employees are subject to VAT and deductible by the 
payor.)18 Because of this difference the flat tax cannot be made border 
adjustable under the GATT, i.e., it cannot be imposed on imports and 
rebated on exports. However, most other countries that use a VAT do 
not allow a deduction for wages and make the VAT border adjustable 
(as permitted under GATT). The flat tax proposal is an origin-based tax; 
11. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 11); S. 1050 § 102 
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 11). 
12. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § l l(d)(l)(B)); S. 1050 § 102 
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § l l(d)(l)(B)). 
13. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 1 l(c), (d)); S. 1050 § 102 
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 1 l(c), (d)). 
14. H.R. 2060 §§ 101, 102 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 63(a)(l)(A), 
ll(c)(2)(A)); S. 1050 §§ 101, 102 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 63(a)(l)(A), 11 
(c)(2)(A)). 
15. Proposed amendment to I.R.C. § ll(d)(l)(A) does not appear to limit 
deductions in this manner. H.R. 2060 § 102; S. 1050 § 102. 
16. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 8, at 76. 
17. H.R.2060 § 101 (proposedamendmenttoI.R.C. § 63(a)(l)(A)); S.1050 § 101 
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. §63(a)(l)(A)). 
18. I owe this observation to Oliver Oldman. 
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most of our trading partners have a destination-based VAT. However, 
this feature of the flat tax by itself should not be a problem, as trade 
economists agree that exempting exports from taxation and imposing 
taxes on imports has no major effect on the balance of trade, even if the 
trading partner adopts an origin-based tax system. 19 
From an international perspective, the crucial point regarding the flat 
tax is that the U.S. income tax base is abandoned as thoroughly as in the 
NST proposal. There is no withholding tax on inbound portfolio 
investment, and no tax is imposed on investment income from sources 
outside the United States. For business entities the expensing of capital 
investments means that the effective rate of tax on marginal returns· is 
zero, even though infra-marginal returns may be subject to tax because 
of the origin principle (this point is elaborated further below). 
3. The USA Proposal: A Progressive Consumption Tax 
The USA proposal is by far the most thoroughly elaborated and 
carefully thought out of the three proposals currently on the table. Not 
only has an extensive description and explanation of the "Unlimited 
Savings Allowance Income Tax System" been published (hereinafter 
referred to as the "USA Tax Description" or, simply, the "Description"), 
but an elaborate bill with specific legislation to replace most of the 
Internal Revenue Code has been introduced as Senate Bill 722.20 The 
following discussion is based on these two sources, and where they 
diverge, the differences will be identified. As will be seen, the USA 
proposal does avoid some of the specific pitfalls that face the two 
proposals discussed above. 
The essence of the USA proposal is as follows. Business is subject 
to a flat 11 % tax rate, which applies to all forms of business (whether 
or not incorporated), with an immediate deduction for capital invest-
ments.21 Financial receipts and payments (such as interest and divi-
dends) are excluded from income and are not deductible, nor (unlike the 
flat tax proposal) is compensation deductible.22 The business tax is 
territorial; businesses are not subject to tax on receipts from sales made 
or services provided outside the United States.23 It is also border 
adjustable; receipts from export sales are excluded, while imports are 
19. See George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure Jr., Implementing Direct 
Consumption Taxes in Developing Countries, 46 TAX L. REV. 405, 479 (1991). 
20. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4; S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995). 
21. S. 722 § 301 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 201(b), 204(a), 205(a)). 
22. Id. (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 202, 203). 
23. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 203(a)). 
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subject to an import tax at the same rate as the business tax ( or, in the 
case of imported services, are not deductible).24 
Individuals are subject to tax at graduated rates (from 8% to 40%, 
according to the legislative proposal) on their worldwide income, just 
like under the current income tax.25 However, individuals can deduct 
all net savings (including bank accounts and other forms of savings) at 
the end of the year and must include in income all dissaving (reduction 
in net savings accumulated in previous years).26 Individuals who also 
own a business must file two separate returns, one for themselves and 
one for the business. 
The business tax is equivalent, in all material respects, to a subtraction 
method VAT: All inputs other than compensation are deductible (if made 
to business tax payers, i.e., registered VAT taxpayers) or subject to tax 
(if made to persons not subject to the tax, such as foreigners in the case 
of imports).27 All receipts from sales of goods or services (but not 
financial receipts) are includible.28 These characteristics mean that the 
tax is most likely border adjustable under the GATT, i.e., it is a 
destination-based VAT, like those imposed by our trading partners.29 
As in the flat tax, the effective rate of tax on new business investment 
in the U.S. will be zero because of the expensing of capital investments. 
For U.S. citizens and residents the tax is imposed on world-wide 
income.30 World-wide savings are likewise deductible.31 The propos-
al preserves the foreign earned income exclusion currently embodied in 
I.R.C. § 911 (currently, up to $70,000).32 According to the USA Tax 
24. Id. (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 265, 266, 267, 286). 
25. Id. § 201 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 1, 15). 
26. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 50). 
27. Id. § 301 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 205). 
28. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 203). 
29. It is likely, but not certain, that the exclusion of export receipts in the USA tax 
would survive a GAIT challenge because of the similarity to a destination-based VAT, 
although the attempt to label the USA tax as a business tax and not a VAT is unlikely 
to be helpful. See Eric Toder, Comments on Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 
66 TAX NOTES 2003 (1995). 
30. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 3(a)). 
31. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 53). As Shay points out, this provision 
means that the actual effect on the USA tax proposal on domestic savings depends on 
the attractiveness of foreign savings options, and on the ability to attract foreign portfolio 
investment. Shay, supra note 3, at 2.2.3; Zodrow & McLure, supra note 19, at 451-52. 
32. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 4(a)(8)). The value of the 
exclusion is increased, however, because of the steep rate schedule of the proposal 
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Description, the foreign tax credit is abolished (but a deduction is 
allowed for foreign taxes imposed on wages earned abroad), but under 
the legislative proposal (which was filed later) the foreign tax credit is 
preserved. 33 
The legislative version of the USA proposal also takes a different view 
on the taxation of non-resident aliens deriving income from sources 
within the United States. The USA Tax Description does not address 
the latter, except by implication, because it envisages repeal of the 
source rules contained in I.R.C. §§ 861-865.34 Since taxing non-
residents on passive ("fixed, determinable, annual or periodic") income 
from the U.S. depends on the source rules, the Description seems to 
envisage abolishing these withholding taxes. This is consistent with the 
de facto repeal of the effective taxation of dividends, interest, and other 
forms of the return on savings, granted it is consistent only by virtue of 
the deductibility of net savings in the first place. 
Senate Bill 722, however, retains the withholding system of current 
law. A 30% tax is levied on amounts received by· nonresident alien 
individuals "from sources within the United States" as FDAP.35 This, 
of course, means that the source rules have to be retained. The portfolio 
interest exemption is likewise retained. There is even an attempt to tax 
non-resident aliens who receive dividends, interest, or wages from 
business operations conducted in the U.S., although the U.S. has never 
succeeded in collecting such "second order" tax on distributions from 
foreign corporations to their shareholders, creditors, or employees.36 
(The legislation does not retain the branch profit tax, which is an 
effective, but complicated, solution to this problem). There is also an 
attempt to retain the tax on expatriates in current section 877, although 
the Treasury has admitted that this tax is almost never enforceable.37 
Moreover, as Steve Shay points out, the effect of the withholding 
provisions of Senate Bill 722 will probably be nil, and the above 
problems will disappear unless the legislative language is changed. That 
result obtains because the withholding rules as drafted only apply to 
(income above $24,000 on a joint return is taxed at the top 40% rate). Shay, supra note 
3, at 2.2.4. 
33. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1524; S. 722 § 201 (proposed 
amendment to 1.R.C. § 20(a)(l)). 
34. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1540. 
35. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131). 
36. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131 (b )( 4 )). 
37. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131(c)); see Samuel's Testimony at 
Finance Hearing on Expatriate Taxation, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-40 (March 22, 
1995), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File. Section 877 has been modified 
in 1996 in an attempt to address these problems; whether the modest modifications will 
achieve this goal remains to be seen. 
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individuals and not to offshore investment companies.38 Dividends and 
interest paid to such entities would also not be subject to the business 
tax because a financial intermediation business conducted entirely 
outside the U.S. is not subject to the tax.39 If these provisions are 
unchanged the U.S. has effectively "given away the store," and inbound 
portfolio investment will be completely untaxed, because any individual 
could set up an offshore investment vehicle to qualify for the exemption. 
B. Destination vs. Origin-Based Taxes 
From an international perspective, the principal difference between the 
flat tax, on the one hand, and the USA tax and the NST, on the other 
hand, is that the former is origin-based (i.e., completely territorial--only 
U.S. source income is taxed), whereas the latter are destination-based 
(imports are taxed and exports are exempt, as in current VATs). As has 
been pointed out repeatedly, it is a fallacy to assume that a destination 
tax encourages exports more than an origin-based tax. That is because, 
as pointed out most recently by Grubert and Newlon,40 if capital is 
immobile and trade must balance at any given moment of time, a tax on 
imports would be the same as a tax on exports because imports must be 
exchanged for exports. When capital is mobile, foreign assets can be 
acquired for exports, and the net exports will be included in the origin 
principle base but not in the destination principle base. However, on the 
margin, every extra dollar of foreign investment will finance future 
imports (purchased with the income from the investment) with a present 
value of one dollar, because trade must balance in the long run. That is, 
the return to the foreign investment is paid out in future imports 
(included in the destination tax base) that is equal in present value terms 
to the exports that financed the foreign investment (included in the 
origin tax base). Thus, at the margin, the origin and destination bases 
are equal because taxing the current marginal export is equal in present 
value terms to taxing the stream of future imports generated by that 
export.41 
38. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131); Shay, supra note 3, at 
2.3.3. 
39. S. 722 § 301 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 242(c)(2)). 
40. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3, at 628. 
41. Id. at 628; see also JCT Report, supra note 5, at 290-92, 296-97. But see 
Hines, supra note 3, who notes some of the limitations of this analysis in the short run. 
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However, a destination-based tax is superior to an origin-based tax 
because of the administrative complexity involved in an origin-based tax. 
Specifically, an origin-based business tax does nothing to resolve the 
transfer pricing problem, which has been vexing the IRS for many years 
and is likely to continue as a major source of difficulty in years to come, 
despite the adoption of new regulations to deal with the problem.42 
This can be illustrated by an example given by Hall and Rabushka of 
a U.S. firm that sends parts to Mexico and re-imports the finished 
product. The value of the exported parts would be included in income, 
and the value of the imported product allowed as a deduction.43 If the 
Mexican entity is controlled by the U.S. exporter/re-importer, there 
would be a strong incentive to value the goods as low as possible on 
their way out and to buy them for as much as possible on their way back 
in as finished products, with the profit remaining in Mexico (where it 
may or may not be taxed, depending on the vicissitudes of the 
Maquiladora regime). There is no I.R.C. § 482 in House Bill 2060 to 
combat this problem. Thus, it is not enough to say, as Hall and 
Rabushka do, that it would be easy to value imports based on "the actual 
amount paid for them in the country of their origin";44 if that amount 
is paid to a related entity, it may bear little relation to actual value, but 
it would be quite hard to prove this, as the IRS has found out under the 
present Code. While this problem exists under present law, it would be 
exacerbated under a territorial system that never taxes foreign profits. 
In addition, McLure and Zodrow have pointed out that because interest 
expense is not deductible and interest income is excluded under the flat 
tax, there will be a significant incentive to shift interest expense to other 
forms of deductible expenses and to shift other forms of income to 
interest income when the other party to the transaction is indifferent 
because they are subject to a traditional income tax.45 This incentive 
could significantly reduce receipts from the business portion of the flat 
tax. For example, assume a U.S. firm (USCo) that sells its products to 
a foreign firm (ForCo) and simultaneously either lends money to ForCo 
or borrows money from ForCo. In the first case (i.e., a loan to ForCo ), 
USCo has an incentive to reduce the price of its products (thus reducing 
taxable receipts) while raising the interest rate on the loan (thus earning 
42. Hines, supra note 3, agrees with this point but argues that transfer pricing 
abuse is unlikely given the low U.S. tax rate under the flat tax. Nevertheless, transfer 
pricing abuse is an issue under any positive rate if the alternative is to locate profits in 
a tax haven or a country with a tax holiday. Moreover, rates are subject to change. 
43. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 8, at 76. 
44. Id. 
45. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 3, at 80. 
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exempt income); ForCo is indifferent since both expenses are deductible. 
In the second case (a loan from ForCo), ForCo would be willing to 
obtain a lower interest rate on its loan to USCo, compensated by the 
lower sales price of the products; USCo benefits from lower taxable 
receipts, while the interest expense is not deductible. The same analysis 
applies, with the roles reversed, when USCo buys products from ForCo; 
in this case, USCo will seek to increase the deductible inputs while 
decreasing the non-deductible interest expense or increasing the 
excludible interest income. 
Some of the problems in the flat tax can perhaps be fixed with 
appropriate technical modifications. For example, the interest income 
and expense issue can be solved by including in income all borrowings 
(principal and interest) and allowing a deduction for all repayments 
(principal and interest), i.e., moving to a cash flow tax, which in present 
value terms is equivalent to the current proposal of excluding interest 
income and disallowing interest deductions.46 However, that would 
reinstate one of the most vexing problems in current law, namely how 
to distinguish between interest expense (deductible) and dividends (non-
deductible in both systems). Similarly, the transfer pricing issue can 
perhaps be solved by extensive auditing and coordination with customs 
valuations where the incentive is to reduce value, although the experi-
ence with these methods under the income tax has been far from 
prom1smg. However, these changes would mean that the resulting 
system would, in practice,· be far from the simple, tax-retum-on-a-
postcard ideal envisaged by the sponsors of the flat tax. 
A destination-based VAT like the USA business tax (and the NST) 
eliminates both of these problems. As the sponsors of the USA proposal 
claim, it would not be advantageous to inflate the price of deductible 
inputs from related parties because that would result in a higher import 
tax being levied on the same inputs.47 However, as discussed below, 
transfer pricing will still be significant from the perspective of our 
trading partners, and this could lead to unfavorable repercussions for 
U.S. businesses. 
In addition, this feature of the USA business tax solves McLure and 
Zodrow's interest problem:48 In the case of a U.S. importer, there 
46. Id. at 17. 
47. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1496-97. 
48. McLure & Zudrow, supra note 3. 
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would be no advantage to increasing the price of (deductible) imported 
goods in exchange for a lower interest rate on borrowed funds or a 
higher rate on funds lent to the seller because the imports would be 
subject to import tax; exports are not a problem since the system ignores 
both receipts from exports and interest income and expense. The USA 
tax is therefore significantly superior to the origin-based flat tax on 
administrative grounds. 
There are several additional reasons for preferring a destination-based 
tax. In an origin-based tax there is some incentive for multinational 
corporations ("MNCs") to locate production in low tax countries in an 
attempt to avoid U.S. tax on super-normal, infra-marginal returns. This 
tax arises because, as Grubert and Newlon pointed out, the destination 
and origin principles are only equivalent if the investment abroad earns 
normal returns. Assume that a U.S. person sells $1 of goods abroad and 
invests the dollar in foreign assets. The export sale would be taxed 
under the origin principle but exempt under the destination principle. If 
the investment abroad results in future imports with a present value of 
$1, the destination and origin principles would result in the same tax in 
the long run. If, on the other hand, the investment results in future 
imports with a present value of $2 (i.e., if it earns above normal returns), 
these returns would be taxed under the destination principle (which taxes 
all imports), but not under the origin principle. However, if the 
investment were domestic, the full return (including any super-normal 
returns) would be taxed under both the origin and destination princi-
ples.49 
In addition, the transition effects of an origin-based tax would confer 
a windfall on U.S. persons holding foreign .assets. That is because (in 
the absence of special transition rules), if a U.S. person holds foreign 
assets acquired prior to the adoption of an origin-based tax, the return on 
those earnings in the form of future imports would escape tax, even 
though the exports used to acquire these assets were not taxed (because 
they occurred before the enactment of the origin-based tax). On the 
other hand, under a destination-based tax, the future imports would be 
taxed.50 
There are some problems associated with a destination-based tax 
(which are grounds for preferring an origin-based tax), but they seem 
less compelling than its advantages. Under a destination-based tax, it is 
necessary to identify non-deductible foreign services and to distinguish 
them from deductible domestic services, giving rise to a transfer pricing 
49. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3, at 629; JCT Report, supra note 5, at 294. 
50. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3, at 629-30. 
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issue. Moreover, it will be necessary under a destination-based tax to 
. allocate the service fees of financial intermediaries between foreign and 
domestic sources. These problems do not exist in an origin-based tax. 
However, they seem no more difficult than the many sourcing issues 
which arise under the current income tax, or under the destination-based 
VAT, as adopted throughout the world, and they are narrower than the 
problems identified above with origin-based taxes.51 
A destination-based consumption tax also creates incentives to shop 
abroad and to emigrate because foreign consumption is exempt from tax. 
However, these incentives can perhaps be countered through adequate 
customs enforcement and through imposing a tax upon emigration. 
Moreover, as Hines pointed out, Americans have traditionally showed 
little inclination to emigrate en masse in response to tax incentives. 52 
IL THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON INBOUND AND OUTBOUND 
INVESTMENT 
A. The Likely Reaction of Taxpayers 
To asses's the likely reaction of taxpayers to the three consumption tax 
proposals, it is necessary first to briefly summarize some of the main 
features of the current international tax regime.53 There are two major 
types of tax jurisdiction: jurisdiction based on the residence of the 
taxpayer and jurisdiction based on the source of the income. The first 
type typically applies to foreign source income of all residents of the 
taxing jurisdiction, whereas the second applies to income derived from 
the taxing jurisdiction by non-residents. In general, the trend in 
international taxation has been to tax portfolio income and wages, most 
of which is earned by individual taxpayers, on a residence basis, while 
active business income, much of which is earned by corporations, is 
taxed primarily on a source basis. In both cases, however, there is 
residual taxation on a source basis of portfolio income ( as indicated by 
the retention of low withholding taxes in tax treaties), and residual 
residence-based taxation of business income (as indicated by Subpart F 
51. Id. at 630. 
52. Hines, supra note 3. 
53. This summary is based on Avi-Yonah, supra note 1. 
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and similar provisions aimed at taxing business income derived from tax 
havens on a residence basis). 
The three consumption tax proposals, if enacted, would tend to 
undermine both of these types of jurisdiction to tax, from the perspective 
of an income tax. Let us consider :first the implications for inbound 
portfolio investment. The ability of foreign countries to implement 
effective residence-based taxation of their residents has always been 
limited by the existence of tax havens, but tax havens do not offer the 
same investment opportunities as a major industrialized economy, and 
some progress has been made in curbing the use of tax havens through 
limitations on treaty benefits and information exchange programs. 
Were the U.S. to abolish income taxation and implement one of the 
three consumption tax proposals, there would likely be no effective 
withholding tax on new inbound portfolio investment. In the case of the 
NST and the flat tax, withholding taxes are abolished. As for the USA 
tax, the proposal abandons the withholding tax, but the legislative 
version retains it in order to induce other countries to enter into treaties 
with the United States. Indeed, the withholding taxes are abolished for 
residents of any foreign country that does not levy similar taxes on U.S. 
residents, and has a tax information sharing agreement with the United 
States.54 We shall discuss the question of treaties further below, but 
there is a problem with the withholding tax as proposed ( even disregard-
ing the technical point identified by Steve Shay, which can perhaps be 
:fixed by changing the statutory language): Since foreigners get no 
deduction for their U.S. savings (they have no net U.S. tax liability and 
savings are not deductible against the gross withholding tax), U.S. 
residents would end up having a much lower tax burden on investments 
in the U.S. than foreigners (except to the extent the portfolio interest 
exemption applies).55 This situation, in addition to being discriminatory 
and arguably violating the very treaties it is designed to salvage, also 
could drive a wedge against foreign investment in the U.S.: Why should 
a U.S. corporation be willing to reimburse a foreign investor against 
withholding taxes imposed on dividends or interest when there is no 
need to similarly reimburse a U.S. investor who pays no effective 
54. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995) (proposed amendment to I.R.C. 
§ 133(c)). 
55. It could be argued that the portfolio interest exemption and other current 
loopholes in the withholding regime mean that abandoning withholding taxes will not 
attract much new investment into the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. does collect 
some $2 billion in withholding taxes each year, and in the case of dividends, the change 
would be significant. 
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tax?56 Moreover, it seems strange for a tax that is intended to apply to 
consumption, but not savings, to operate precisely the opposite way 
when it comes to non-residents: While a French citizen visiting the 
United States may consume as much as she desires without being subject 
to the USA tax, the same person would be subject to tax when she 
invests her savings in the shares of a United States corporation. It 
would seem more consistent with the purposes of the USA proposal to 
refrain from taxing such investments from abroad. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the withholding tax would survive under the USA proposal 
and its abolition seems more consistent with the goals of that proposal 
as set out in the Description.57 
Ever since the U.S. unilaterally abolished withholding on portfolio 
interest investments by foreigners in 1984, a significant portion the 
world's capital flight has found itself channeled to the U.S.58 The 
result has been an acute lack of capital in many developing countries, 
whose elites found it much safer to invest tax-free in the U.S. than to 
invest in taxable (or even tax-free, but riskier) projects back home. This 
phenomenon will likely be amplified many times over if the income tax 
is entirely abolished. Since the U.S. will not tax funds spent on 
consumption outside its boundaries, while consumption goes effectively 
untaxed in many other jurisdictions, much of the world's mobile capital 
may be invested tax-free in the U.S., but consumed outside its bor-
ders.59 The likely outcome for both outbound and inbound direct 
investment would be similar: A net increase in investment in the U.S. 
56. Admittedly, similar situations exist currently; for example, foreigners typically 
pay a higher rate of tax for investments in countries that grant shareholders integration 
credits for corporate taxes, because such credits are typically granted only to domestic 
shareholders. But the gap is usually smaller than the 30%+ wedge (between a zero 
effective rate and a 30% rate on the gross payment) that would exist under the USA tax. 
57. S. 722 § IOl(a). 
58. Foreign portfolio investment in the U.S. has risen from $25.7 billion in 1980 
to $202.5 billion in 1994, compared to a rise in foreign direct investment from $16.9 
(1980) to only $49.4 (1994). By comparison, U.S. portfolio investment abroad has also 
risen, but at a much slower rate (from $54.4 billion in 1980 to $81.5 billion in 1994), 
while U.S. direct investment abroad is comparable to foreign direct investment into the 
U.S. ($19.2 billion in 1980, $49.4 billion in 1994). JCT Report, supra note 5, Table 1. 
59. Grubert and Newlon agree with this conclusion, but note that the effect may 
be dampened if the move to a consumption tax reduces U.S. interest rates. Grubert & 
Newlon, supra note 3, at 632-35. See also JCT Report, supra note 5, at 318-22. 
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and a net decrease in investment in other countries. 60 That is because 
under all three proposals the effective rate of tax for the normal returns 
on new investment in the U.S. would be zero. For U.S. corporations, 
who currently benefit from deferral of the foreign source active income 
of their subsidiaries ( and therefore seek to increase such foreign source 
earnings), the main goal would become to shift as much of their world-
wide profit as possible to the U.S. This can be achieved, e.g., by 
transfer pricing manipulation (i.e., by inflating the cost of goods sold by 
U.S. entities to related parties abroad), and by repatriating as much 
earnings as possible from foreign subsidiaries as deductible interest or 
royalty payments. The end result would likely be a distortion of capital 
flows, with increasing investment by U.S.-based multinationals in the 
U.S., even if (but for taxes) other areas of the world are more promising. 
As far as inbound foreign direct investment is concerned, the likely 
outcome from abolishing the income tax will be a repetition of the 
scenario for outbound direct investment, but in the reverse: Foreign-
based multinationals will seek to expand their investments in the U.S., 
possibly by buying U.S. corporations and shifting taxable profits to them 
in the same ways outlined above. 
To sum up, the likely effects of abolishing the income tax and 
replacing it with a consumption tax would be to attract significantly 
more investment into the U.S. Foreign portfolio investment may flow 
in, at significant costs to the ability of other countries to effectively tax 
their residents. Both U.S. and foreign corporations would likely attempt 
to shift taxable profits to the U.S. These conclusions, however, may be 
affected by the likely reaction of other countries. 
B. The Likely Reaction of Our Trading Partners 
When discussing the likely reaction of other countries, it is necessary 
to distinguish between our major trading partners, which have developed 
economies that can expect investment by MNCs even when their tax 
rates are higher than the U.S. rate, and the rest of the world, which 
cannot expect to compete for investment in the absence of a favorable 
tax regime. For developing and transition economies, a shift by the 
United States to a consumption tax ( and in particular, the abolition of 
withholding taxes on portfolio investment and of the corporate income 
tax) may effectively force them to abandon residence-based income 
60. As Grubert and Newlon conclude, "MNCs would likely shift tangible 
investment, intangible assets, and R&D to the United States." Grubert & Newlon, supra 
note 3, at 620. But as discussed below, this conclusion may not take sufficiently into 
account the reaction of other countries. 
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taxation altogether, which may or may not be consistent with their long-
term interests and policy preferences.61 
As for developed countries, the question is how they are likely to react 
to the increase in U.S.-bound investment by both American and foreign 
MNCs. There are two possible reactions. In the first, the reduction of 
taxes by the U.S. will force other countries to reduce their taxes on 
capital as well, and perhaps adopt similar reforms, as envisaged by 
McLure. Grubert and Newlon seem to consider this the most likely 
outcome, and state that the overall effect on global efficiency is unclear: 
While the distortionary tendency to shift capital to the U.S. would be 
muted, other countries may have to raise other taxes to make up for the 
lost revenue, which could lead to other types of distortion. The choice 
facing those other countries may be more politically difficult than 
envisaged by Grubert and Newlon: Countries which have a VAT 
already tax consumption at much higher rates than the U.S., and 
individual income tax rates also tend to be higher. Thus, countries with 
little leverage may have no choice but to reduce taxes on capital without 
replacing the foregone revenue, with significant policy effects.62 
However, there is another possible reaction, especially for developed 
countries like our major trading partners. Those countries could try to 
capture the tax revenue unilaterally foregone by the U.S. "Taxation 
abhors a vacuum": In the past, whenever situations arose that enabled 
MNCs to channel their profits to low-tax jurisdictions, the members of 
the OECD took steps (like the adoption of Subpart F by the U.S. and 
thereafter by other OECD members) to capture the tax on those profits. 
In the case of foreign MN Cs, the reaction of foreign countries would be 
relatively simple: To extend the world-wide taxation of their resident 
MNCs to capture the U.S. source profits. In that situation, the U.S. will 
ironically have to make the same argument that it has consistently 
ignored in refusing to grant tax sparing credits in its treaties: That other 
countries are essentially transferring revenue from its fisc to their own, 
thus nullifying the effect of the tax holiday granted by the U.S. Other 
countries may then reply, as the U.S. has consistently since the 1960s, 
61. For a view advocating this result as advantageous to developing countries (on 
a consensual, not forced, basis) see Zodrow & McLure, supra note 19. 
62. But see Grubert & Newlon, Reply, supra note 3, at 269 (arguing that other 
countries do have scope to raise consumption taxes). I believe such a choice would be 
very difficult politically, whatever the data on taxes as a percentage of GDP. 
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that the U.S. should not have made the tax holiday possible in the first 
place. 
The reason foreign countries with major MNCs (i.e., the other OECD 
members) are likely to adopt this attitude is that they are unlikely to be 
harmed by it, in the sense of losing investments by their MNCs to the 
U.S. From the point of view of a foreign MNC, the adoption of 
consumption taxation and the abolition of the U.S. corporate income tax 
( except on super-normal returns, under an origin-based tax) represent a 
pure windfall, which would lead it to expand investment in the U.S. 
The imposition of home country tax on that income would restore the 
situation to the status quo before the windfall and investment patterns 
would return to their normal state. Grubert and Newlon consider this 
option unlikely and believe investment in the U.S. would increase even 
if (as is .likely) no credit is given abroad for the consumption-based 
taxes, because of deferral and cross-crediting.63 However, deferral is 
unlikely to be granted to the U.S. given th.at the effective U.S. tax rate 
will be zero, and even countries that currently exempt active foreign 
income may rethink this position in the face of such a tax haven; while 
cross-crediting can be eliminated by the simple expedient of a per-
country limitation for the U.S. (since all U.S. income from capital will 
be taxed at the zero rate, no internal averaging is possible). 
As for U.S.-based MNCs, other developed countries, which can count 
on some level of continued U.S. direct investment, may be able to 
capture some of the revenue foregone by the U.S. on those entities as 
well. Grubert and Newlon point out the likely imposition of transfer 
pricing rules and thin capitalization requirements by foreign governments 
as a reaction to the adoption of consumption tax reform by the U.S.;64 
in addition, changes in the source rules are possible to make more 
income of U.S. MNCs sourced in the foreign countries where they 
conduct business. Once again, the U.S. MNCs may refrain from 
penalizing foreign countries by pulling out altogether as long as the 
overall effect of those changes is simply to reverse the windfall resulting 
from the abolition of the U.S. corporate income tax. The end result is 
less distortion in the allocation of global capital investment than in the 
absence of such reactions by foreign governments, but also a direct 
transfer of funds from the U.S. fisc to those of our trading partners. 
In conclusion, the likely reaction of other governments to tax reform 
in the United States depends on their relative strength in attracting 
inbound investment. Countries with small or underdeveloped markets 
63. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3. 
64. Id. 
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may be forced to follow the U.S. in abandoning income taxation and 
either replace it with higher taxes on consumption or abandon some of 
the policy goals for which they need the tax revenues from the income 
tax. Other countries, with more leverage, may react by entering into 
another form of tax competition, in which they try to capture the tax 
base foregone by the U.S. 
III. THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON THE 
U.S. TAX TREATY NETWORK 
The income tax treaty network is one of the most significant 
achievements of 20th century international law. Through more than 
1,200 bilateral treaties conforming in general to the OECD or UN 
models, most countries have agreed to follow a broad consensus about 
the proper allocation of taxable income among taxing jurisdictions. This 
consensus has been described above. In treaty terms, it can be 
summarized as follows: Active business income is taxable by the 
jurisdiction in which it is earned (the source jurisdiction) if the activities 
of the taxpayer in that jurisdiction are significant enough to rise to the 
level of a "permanent establishment." Passive income, on the other 
hand, is taxable primarily in the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer 
resides (the residence jurisdiction), with only a relatively low withhold-
ing tax being payable to the source country.65 
While this consensus has several unsolved problems ( as described 
above), overall it has proven to be extremely resilient and has been 
maintained through fifty years of immense economic and technological 
changes. However, if a major player in the world economy unilaterally 
abandons income taxation, the survival of the consensus is .far from 
assured, and the likely replacement if the consensus collapses is far from 
clear. 
The simplest case to consider in this regard is again the NST proposal 
to completely abolish the income tax and replace it with a sales tax. 
Obviously, this reform would render all existing U.S. income tax treaties 
obsolete. There would be a highly significant enticement for both 
portfolio capital and direct investment to flow into the U.S., and there 
would be no reason other than competition for capital for countries not 
65. See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1. 
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to tax inbound U.S. investment. Thus, there would be little incentive to 
keep the treaty regime in place. 
The situation would not be much different under the other two regimes 
considered above. First, as a purely legal matter, neither the flat tax nor 
the USA tax likely qualify as "income taxes" under the U.S. definition 
of the term, because they both deny a deduction for interest expense. 
(Nor would the situation change if loans were included in income and 
principal and interest were deductible, because the inclusion of loans 
would violate the realization requirement that defines an income tax 
under U.S. rules).66 Thus, in both cases, the United States has no right 
to expect that other countries would maintain their income tax treaties 
with it after tax reform is enacted, unless it is in their interest to do so, 
because the tax that the U.S. would levy is not an income tax. 
Fundamentally, income tax conventions apply to taxes on "income and 
capital," therefore, taxes on consumption are not covered.67 . 
Under the flat tax regime, the U.S. tax system is completely territorial, 
has very low effective? corporate and individual tax rates, and does not 
tax passive income (i.e.; there is no withholding). As far as direct 
investment is concerned, the effect is similar to abolishing the corporate 
income tax, because there is no effective tax on the normal returns to 
new investment. Thus, large foreign countries would have the same 
incentive to capture the residual income foregone by the U.S. For 
portfolio investment, the result under the flat tax is identical to the 
abolition of the income tax, because there is no taxation of passive 
income flowing out of the United States. Thus, in practice, foreign 
countries that have the ability to attract American business would have 
no incentive to renegotiate tax treaties with the U.S. to cover the flat tax 
(especially since there is no taxation of U.S. investment abroad); instead, 
as outlined under the sales tax scenario, they would expand their tax 
base of direct investment, while a race to the bottom would develop for 
portfolio investment. 
66. See I.R.C. § 901 (West Supp. 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4) (1983). The 
author has been involved in trying to persuade the U.S. Treasury that a Bolivian tax that 
was similar to the USA business tax, except that it included loans in income and 
permitted deductions of principal and interest, was a creditable tax, to no avail. 
67. For a more optimistic view, see JCT Report, supra note 5, at 334-47, which 
takes the view that the reaction by treaty partners depends in large part on the form of 
the tax reform in the United States. On the other hand, Grubert & Newlon, Reply, supra 
note 3, at 270, views U.S. tax reform as no different from other countries that have in 
the past lowered their taxes on capital (e.g., through accelerated depreciation). I believe 
moving to a consumption tax in the U.S., with all the attendant rhetoric about abolishing 
the income tax, is fundamentally different, if only because it will be politically very 
difficult to re-adopt an income tax. 
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Finally, the USA proposal, especially in its legislative form, makes an 
effort to save the income tax treaty system, but that effort seems unlikely 
to succeed. First, in regard to direct investment, the effect of the USA 
proposal is the abolition of the corporate income tax and its replacement 
by a destination-based VAT. Thus, there would be no reason for our 
treaty partners to maintain their treaties with the U.S. for corporate 
income taxation, because the U.S. will not have a corporate tax base. 
Second, for portfolio investment, the USA proposal maintains world-
wide taxation of U.S. residents and (nominally) withholding taxes on 
non-residents. However, residents are effectively exempt from U.S. 
taxation of their domestic investments because of the deduction for net 
savings and therefore would not invest abroad unless the effective tax 
rate on their investment at source is zero. In this situation, foreign 
governments are unlikely to want to maintain a treaty network with the 
U.S., because they would have to reduce their withholding at source to 
zero to attract U.S. investors even in the absence of a treaty, and if they 
do so, the U.S. withholding tax would likewise disappear (or else the 
U.S. could not attract foreign capital). The end result is, therefore, likely 
to be similar to that described for the other two cases: An expansion of 
foreign taxation of direct investment to capture the tax base abandoned 
by the U.S. and the abolition of all taxation at source for portfolio 
investment. 
Grubert and Newlon argue counter-intuitively that even though the flat 
tax and USA tax are not income taxes and thus would entitle foreign 
governments to terminate the treaties with the U.S., they would not do 
so because of their fear that, in the absence of a treaty, the U.S. would 
impose its high statutory withholding rate on investments from the 
foreign country into the U.S., while retaining the treaty would force the 
U.S. (because of the non-discrimination provision) to impose no 
withholding taxes on foreign investment, because no tax is imposed on 
domestic investment.68 
This point seems inconsistent with the rest of Grubert and Newlon's 
argument. The whole thrust of their article up to the point in which they 
make this argument has been to show that foreign residents ( especially 
MNCs) would have significant incentives to move their investments into 
the U.S. because of the effective zero tax rate. Foreign governments 
68. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3. 
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presumably would not welcome this development, and may indeed ( as 
Grubert and Newlon state) face considerable pressure to reduce their 
own tax rate to counter it.69 Thus, it seems unlikely that foreign 
governments would object to high U.S. withholding taxes on foreign 
direct investment, which would at least reduce, if not eliminate, the 
incentive to shift investment into the U.S. Foreign governments may 
terminate their treaties precisely to achieve the imposition of withholding 
taxes, as well as to have the right to discriminate against U.S. investment 
in the case of a tax war; for the same reasons, the U.S. seems unlikely 
to want to impose such taxes. In fact, none of the current proposals 
envisage retaining the thirty percent withholding rate for corporations, 
while individuals already benefit from no withholding on portfolio 
interest investment.70 
Grubert and Newlon, as well as Hines, make one further argument for 
the proposition that tax treaties will be retained: Foreign governments 
might not wish their own statutory withholding rates to apply to U.S. 
investors, since that would make their country even less competitive with 
the U.S.71 But surely, if they wish to do so, foreign governments can 
abolish their own withholding taxes on U.S. investors, even in the 
absence of a treaty, just as the U.S. did when it adopted the portfolio 
interest exemption in 1984.72 Thus, it seems unlikely that the U.S. 
treaty regime would survive a move to a consumption tax base by the 
United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The discussion above suggested that the adoption of any of the 
consumption tax proposals by the U.S. would have significant interna-
tional implications and may lead to the dismantling of the current 
69. Id. 
70. Stephen Shay also notes that the point made by Grubert and Newlon would 
only apply to countries that export more capital to the U.S. than they import from it. 
Many OECD members, and almost all non-OECD member countries, currently import 
more capital from the U.S. than they export into it, especially when portfolio investment 
(which is generally not subject to withholding taxes) is excluded; although this 
relationship could shift if the U.S. adopts a consumption tax. Shay, supra note 3. 
71. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3; Hines, supra note 3. 
72. Hines also points out that other countries may not wish to terminate their tax 
treaties with the U.S. because of their general diplomatic relationship with the U.S. 
government. While this may be true, it seems very risky to rely on the general 
diplomatic relations to avoid termination of treaties when such termination is in the 
economic interest of the treaty partner, and the treaty partner has the legal right to 
terminate the treaty under the Vienna Convention. It may even be possible, as Shay 
points out, to terminate the withholding tax reductions in a treaty while leaving the non-
discrimination article in place. 
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international tax regime, as embodied in the treaty system. The 
remaining question is: Would that development be positive or negative, 
and if the latter, what can the U.S. do to mitigate any adverse effects? 
The answer to this question is difficult, because it depends not only 
on the likely reactions by taxpayers to the reform, but also to the 
reactions of foreign governments, which are much more difficult to 
predict with any accuracy. Fundamentally, one can envisage two 
scenarios: positive and negative. · 
Under the positive scenario, fundamental tax reform in the U.S. is 
followed by a shift to consumption taxes by most, if not all, other 
countries in the world. Whether that would be a positive development 
from the perspective of either equity or efficiency lies beyond the scope 
of this Article. However, as McClure pointed out, such a development 
has definite potential for drastically simplifying the international tax 
regime, as evidenced by the current situation with respect to VAT.73 
In the case of VAT, because all countries follow the destination 
principle, the allocation of the tax base among countries is much less 
complicated than in an income tax, and there is no need for an elaborate 
network of tax treaties to resolve disputes in that regard. Thus, if one 
can envision a world with no income taxation, as does McLure, it 
certainly has some appeal from an international tax perspective, if only 
in reduced transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the situation is less promising if a significant 
number of countries wish to retain the income tax. In the case of 
developing countries, as outlined above, this may be very difficult to 
achieve if the U.S. abolishes the income tax because those countries do 
not have the leverage to attract the investment that will flow into the 
U.S. This will be especially true if the U.S. abandons its current 
cooperation in information exchange programs, which are the only 
means by which such countries can enforce residence-based taxation on 
the U.S. income of their citizens. 
In the case of developed countries, as discussed above, if they retain 
their income tax, there will be a significant incentive to abandon their 
tax treaties with the U.S. and enter into a "tax war," in which each 
country attempts to capture the income tax base foregone by the U.S. 
Such a development may not have a negative effect if all it does is 
73. See Charles E. McLure Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation 
for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992). 
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restore the status quo, by effectively inducing MNCs to shift investments 
back to the pattern that existed before the U.S. abolished the corporate 
income tax. On the other hand, in the absence of a tax treaty system, 
one could envisage situations in which several countries try to tax the 
same U.S. source profits simultaneously (e.g., by allocating the same 
profits to domestic sources), which could lead to increased circumstances 
of double taxation. 
Assuming that tax reform is adopted, the key issue therefore is: What 
should the U.S. be doing to prevent negative consequences from tax 
reform? Three points may be suggested in this regard. First, in regard 
to the taxation of portfolio investment, the U.S. should maintain and 
seek to expand its exchange of information program, to enable other 
countries to impose residence-based income taxation on U.S. source 
income of their residents. The exchange of information article has 
recently enabled the U.S. to enter into several tax treaties with develop-
ing countries, even with the portfolio interest exemption in place, and the 
same trend could continue following tax reform. This, however, would 
mean that the IRS and its information collecting capacity (which is the 
most advanced in the world) should be retained, contrary to the desire 
of some current tax reformers.74 
Second, in regard to direct investment, we may want to maintain some 
ways for U.S.-based MNCs to use the U.S. government to prevent 
double taxation of their profits, even in the absence of a tax treaty. 
While the current competent authority mechanism depends on the tax 
treaty, it may be possible to maintain those links, for example, under the 
aegis of friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties, which do not 
depend on both countries sharing the same tax base. 
Third, the U.S. could use its leverage in other contexts to prevent 
other countries from launching measures that discriminate against U.S. 
residents, even in the absence of a tax treaty. In particular, the World 
Trade Organization, in which there is the ability for discussing many 
issues simultaneously, may offer a potential venue in this regard.75 
Indeed, it may be that, in an increasingly competitive world, the role of 
the bilateral tax treaty is over and that a multilateral system that can 
address tax together with other issues is needed to resolve the types of 
potential conflict addressed in this Article. 
74. See, e.g., H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996), which would forbid 
appropriations to the IRS after the year 2000. 
75. Note, however, that in the Uruguay Round the U.S. steadfastly refused to 
submit tax matters to the jurisdiction of the WTO. 
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